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ABSTRACT 
We report the results of an experiment studying the interaction of status with type of 
account (excuses vs justifications) in determining the acceptance of accounts. Excuses and 
justifications were selected that had the same rank order of acceptability when rated by an 
independent sample drawn from the same population as the subjects of the experiment. 
Normative expectations were violated in a computerized tragedy of the commons task by an 
authority who offered either an excuse or a justification. We found that status was positively 
correlated with acceptance of justifications but negatively correlated with acceptance of 
excuses. In addition, unlike much recent research on accounts, justifications were more readily 
accepted than excuses. We conclude from this that it is a mistake to overgeneralize from 
previous findings that excuses are always more readily accepted than justifications. Concrete 
details of offense and setting appear to interact with type of account in determinng their 
acceptance. 
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STATUS, EXCUSES, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
L INTRODUCTION. 
In theories of accounts there are good reasons for believing that acceptance of any kind 
of account, whether an excuse or a justification, is positively correlated with status. (See 
especially Blumstein, et al, 1974; Hunter, 1984; Scott and Lyman, 1968.) In attribution theories 
there are good reasons for believing that acceptance of excuses, but not justifications, is 
inversely correlated with status. (This can be shown to follow from either Jones and McGillis, 
1976 or Kelley, 1967, but see especially Thibaut and Riecken, 1955 and Hamilton, 1978; 1980.) 
Where theories of accounts predict that status has the same effect on acceptance of any kind 
of account, attribution theories imply a status by type-of-account interaction. In a previous 
paper we found support for the hypothesis that, unless a justification is unambiguously invalid, 
its acceptance increases with status (Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch, 1997). In the present 
paper we ask whether status has the same effect on excuses that it has on justifications. 
II. HYPOTHESIS. 
The idea of linking theories of accounts and attributions is not especially new. (E.g. see 
Crittenden, 1983; Snyder, Higgins, and Stucky, 1983.) Both are about how ordinary people 
explain behavior. In theories of accounts, an unexpected, untoward act is normalized—made 
warrantable and intelligible (from Garfinkel, 1964)— by an explanation that either accepts that 
the act is wrong but denies responsibility for it (excuses) or accepts responsibility for it but 
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denies that it is wrong (justifications) (from Austin, 1956). Attribution theories describe how 
events come to be attributed to one or more of their possible causes (Heider, 1958), hence how 
actors come to be held responsible for them (Hamilton, 1978). Causes are either internal 
(attributed to actors) or external (attributed to situations). In either case they are either stable 
or transient. Ability is a stable, fatigue a transient, internal cause. Task difficulty is a stable, 
luck or accident a transient, external cause. The theory of account's excuses are fashioned by 
appeal to attribution theory's external, or transient-internal, causes. Either diminishes 
responsibility for an unexpected, untoward act. Attribution theory complements the theory 
of accounts because whether an excuse is accepted or not is an important dependent variable 
in the theory of accounts; acceptance should depend in part on the credibility of the excuse; 
and whether an excuse is credible or not is something attribution theory should be able to 
explain. 
Status plays a role in both theories. In the theory of accounts, status is factor that gives 
an actor the capacity to influence another to accept an account (Scott and Lyman, 1968). In 
attribution theory, category expectancies (such as status) are a factor from which knowledge, 
ability, and control, hence locus of causality, are inferred (Jones and McGillis, 1976; Thibaut 
Riecken, 1955). In the more sociologically oriented "intuitive lawyer" variant of attribution 
theory, role expectations play the same role in inferences of responsibility (Hamilton, 1978; 
1980). But the part status plays in the two theories is different. In theories of accounts, status 
is an advantage whether the account is an excuse or a justification. But in attribution theories 
status is a liability. Attribution theories have nothing to say about justifications, but about 
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excuses they imply that external, or internal-transient, causes are more credible of low than 
high status.1 The reason why attribution theory implies a negative effect of status on the 
acceptance of excuses is that, in both its forms (i.e. for both "intuitive psychologists" and 
"intuitive lawyers"), status is positively correlated with knowledge, ability, freedom and 
control. (See especially Jones and McGillis, 1976; Hamilton, 1978,1980; Thibaut and Riecken, 
1955.) Knowledge, ability, freedom and control are positively correlated with inferences of 
intentionality, stable-internal causes, and responsibility. But intentionality, stable-internal 
causes, and responsibility diminish the credibility of excuses.2 
The hypothesis that status is correlated with expectations of knowledge, ability, freedom 
and control has been consistently supported by empirical studies (Hamilton, Blumenfeld, and 
Kushler, 1988; Hamilton and Sanders, 1981; 1983; Nazareth and Kanekar, 1986; and, less 
robustly, Hegtvedt, Thompson, and Cook, 1993). Empirical studies have also consistently 
supported the hypothesis that expectations of knowledge, ability, freedom and control are 
positively correlated with internal causality (Thibaut and Riecken, 1955) and attributions of 
responsibility (Hamilton, Blumenfeld, and Kushler, 1988; Hamilton and Sanders, 1981; 1983). 
But few studies have attempted to investigate a status by type-of-account interaction 
and where they have, evidence of a status by type-of-account interaction is at best inconclusive. 
Looking at all studies in which there is any inequality (status, power, authority), any account 
variable (demands, offers, acceptance), and any account (excuses, justifications, both): 
Interactions are sometimes found and sometimes not. Where an interaction is found, its 
pattern is not consistent from study to study (citations below). 
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Comparing studies of justifications with studies of excuses does suggest an interaction. 
Gonzales, 1992 and Gonzales, et al, 1990 found that justifications were used more often and 
more successfully by high than low status offenders. Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch, 1997 also 
found that, unless a justification was consensually invalid, its acceptance was positively 
correlated with status. On the other hand, neither offers of excuses (Wiley and Eskilson, 1981) 
nor their acceptance (Ungar, 1981) are much affected by status. This suggests a status-by-type 
of account interaction, but not the one suggested by attribution theory. 
Studies in which excuses can be more directly compared with justifications seldom find 
any interaction at all. Four find no status effects on either (Hunter, 1993; Hunter and 
McClelland, 1991; McClelland and Hunter, 1992; Riordan, Marlin, and Gidwani, 
1988). Five find positive effects of status but no status by type-of-account interaction 
(Blumstein, et al, 1974; Felson and Ribner, 1981; Much and Schweder, 1978; Walton and 
Sedlak, 1982; Weinstein, 1980). 
Three do find a significant interaction (Gonzales, 1992; McLaughlin, Cody, and O'Hair, 
1983; Shields, 1979), but the direction of the interaction is not consistent from study to study. 
And the direction found by Shields (1979), that excuses are positively but justifications 
negatively associated with status, is inconsistent with the hypothesis suggested by attribution 
theory. But even if the interactions were consistent, there would be a problem trying to 
draw conclusions about a status by type-of- account interaction from this body of research. It 
is difficult to compare the effect of status on the acceptance of excuses with its effect on the 
acceptance of justifications without some independent criterion equating acceptability of the 
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particular excuses used with that of the particular justifications used. 
It is the fact that we think we have a reasonable method of comparing the two kinds of 
accounts that led us to the experiment we report in the present paper. In this experiment, we 
will look at a subject (B)'s, private acceptance of an excuse or a comparable justification by 
a confederate (A) of an unexpected, untoward act by A, where "private" acceptance means 
that B's response is not observable to A. The hypothesis we test is that 
HYPOTHESIS 1. There is a status by type-of-account interaction such that 
a. B's private acceptance of a justification by A is directly proportional to the 
status of A relative to B; 
b. B's private acceptance of excuses by A is inversely proportional to the status 
of A relative to B. 
HI. METHOD 
A. Setting.3 
The setting we used to test this hypothesis was a computerized version of the tragedy 
of the commons dilemma (Messick, et al, 1983), and the subjects understood the experiment to 
be a study of this dilemma. Two subjects, occupying separate rooms and working on separate 
computer terminals, were instructed by computer that each represented a community each of 
which possessed local water supplies fed from a single, finite, reserve. (The dilemma was given 
this particular form because of drought in California at the time.) The dilemma was to balance 
personal interests in providing as much water as possible for their community against the 
collective interest of both communities in sustaining the water supply for as long as possible. 
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Each subject earned one point for each unit of water used, and points earned money at the end 
of the experiment. But no one could continue to use water if anyone used up the total water 
supply.4 Subjects did not know how much water was used by the other community. 
The experiment consisted of ten trials, or turns, at each of which each subject withdrew 
a variable amount of water from his/her community's local reserve for use by his/her 
community. At the end of each trial, the local community reserve was replenished from the 
general reserve by a "water monitor" (WM). WM's behavior was pre-programmed by the 
computer, hence WM functioned like a confederate of the experimenter. Subjects were told 
that they would complete three rounds of ten trials each, but in fact they completed only one 
round. 
Before the first trial of the experiment, subjects voted on whether the WM should 
replenish local reserves after each turn at a fixed rate (of one-half of whatever was left in the 
local reserve) or, alternatively, at whatever rate the WM thought fit. The vote was manipulated 
so that it always turned out two-to-one in favor of the fixed rate. 
Thus, the vote established the expectation that subjects would be replenished at a rate 
of one half the amount of water left in their local reserve at each turn, an expectation that WM 
violated on four of the ten turns. Subjects on these four critical trials were replenished with 
zero units of water. Nor was there any possible way to mistake what W M was doing or who 
was doing it. 
Such an unambiguous offense is well outside the scope of existing evaluation-
expectation theories of status, and threatens any attempt to manipulate the status conditions 
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of the accounts process, especially in a repeated measures design. But it is incongruence 
between expectations and actions that activates normalization processes, hence the veridical 
offense. 
The ten trials of the experiment were arranged in a fixed order in such a way that in 
each of two blocks of five trials there were two replenishment (R) trials, on which WM behaved 
as expected; followed by one non-replenishment (NoR), offense trial, on which WM violated 
expectations without offering an account; followed by one replenishment trial on which 
expected behavior immediately followed an offense for which there had been no account; 
followed by one non-replenishment, account (NoR,A) trial on which an offense was 
immediately followed by an account Accounts were introduced only at trials five and ten. But, 
because of the repeated measures design, the second block of trials differed from the first in 
that all the behavior of the W M in the second block of trials could be interpreted by subjects 
in the light of the first account at trial five.5 
Accounts were offered whether or not subjects demanded them. It was possible for 
subjects to question the behavior of the WM on any trial, but they were instructed that, in 
order not to unduly disrupt the flow of the experiment, their questions would only be answered 
after selected turns. Whether or not a subject ever asked a question, at trial five s/he received 
an explanation responding to any questions asked by anyone during trials one to five and at 
trial ten s/he received an explanation responding to any questions asked by anyone during 
trials six to ten. The two accounts were the same except for small differences in wording. 
Following the first offer of an account at trial five, the second at trial ten was worded in a way 
that referred to the first in order to maintain plausibility. 
B. The Dependent Variable. 
Following each trial, subjects completed a computerized questionnaire designed to 
assess their responses to the WM's behavior. They were instructed that in addition to 
examining the behavior of individuals in the commons dilemma, we were also interested in 
their impressions of it. Among other questions, they were asked to indicate on a five-point 
scale (where 5 was the highest score) the extent to which they regarded their own actions, the 
other participant's actions, and the WM's actions on the most recently completed turn to be 
appropriate, justified, legitimate, and fair. An index of the acceptability of the WM's account 
at each trial was made by summing responses to the WM on these four items, which measure 
the subjects' beliefs in the propriety of the WM's behavior on that trial (cf Massey, Freeman, 
and Zelditch, 1997). 
Measured in an earlier experiment in the same setting (Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch, 
1997), this index had an average alpha of .92 over the ten trials of the experiment and alpha 
decreased if any of the four items was deleted from the scale. There was some difference 
between alpha for the first trial of the experiment and all other trials. It was .85 on the first 
trial of the experiment. Because many subjects still treated this trial as a practice trial, we 
decided to omit it in the present paper. Alpha increased to .91 on the second trial and 
thereafter ranged from .90 to .96. 
C. Comparability of Excuses and Justifications. 
Excuses and justifications were generated and ranked by independent samples of 
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subjects drawn from the same population as those used in the present experiment. One sample 
of 20 female subjects was led through five trials of the commons dilemma task, after which they 
were asked to write down what they thought would be a good or bad excuse and a good or bad 
justification for the water monitor's failure to replenish local water reserves. A second sample 
of 22 male and 40 female subjects, drawn from the same population (Stanford undergraduates 
with no previous experience in deception experiments), was again led through five trials of the 
commons dilemma task and then asked to rate on a seven-point scale the acceptability of the 
excuses and justifications generated by the first sample of subjects.6 
In the present experiment we equated the acceptability of excuses and justifications by 
using two accounts each of which was at the mid-rank of the mean ratings given by the second 
sample of subjects. Accounts at the mid-rank were comparatively ambiguous: They were at 
the mid-rank because there was less consensus about rating them. Nevertheless, we believe that 
our procedure makes the acceptability of the excuses we used comparable to that of the 
justifications we used for the population from which the subjects were sampled. (It would be 
unwise to generalize the comparability of the two beyond the population used for the 
experiment.) 
Ninety-two subjects participated in the experiment. Forty-two of these heard excuses. 
The excuse was, "I didn't refill your local reserve because the records got mixed up—out of my 
control." Fifty heard justifications. The justification was, " I didn't refill your local reserve 
because we should wait for bad times to dig into reserves." 
D. Status. 
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We crossed these two accounts with two levels of status. Forty-three of the ninety-two 
subjects interacted with a (fictitious) equal status WM, who they were told was randomly 
chosen from the same subject pool that they themselves were chosen from. Forty-nine 
interacted with a WM specially chosen for having completed a PhD dissertation on water 
resource management. 
IV. RESULTS. 
The basic design of the experiment crossed two between factors (status and type of 
account) with one repeated factor (trial). A preliminary analysis was made of a 2 (status) by 
2 (type of account) by 9 (trials) repeated measures analysis of variance (RMANOVA), but the 
more important analysis is a 2 x 2 x 6 RMANOVA of trials 5-10, i.e. the trials including and 
following the first account. Because the within-subjects variable violated the assumption that 
the variances of all differences are equal, we report only the multi-variate RMANOVA which 
does not require this assumption (Girden, 1992; Stevens, 1986). (Significance levels are 
reported for the Pillais-Bartlett Trace.) 
A. Preliminaries. 
The main effect of trial was significant for trials 2-10 (P=.000), suggesting that each trial 
of the experiment had a unique effect. That the non-replenishment on trial 3 was unexpected 
and untoward is evident from the sharp decrease in acceptability of the WM's behavior 
between trials 2 and 3 (see table 1). Averaging 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
across between-subjects factors, WM lost 7.59 points from trial 2 to trial 3. (P=.000 in an 
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analysis of trial by trial differences.) Although we did not predict it (because the offense is 
unambiguous), there was also a significant effect of status on the number of points lost between 
the two trials (P=.008). 
Finally, there was also a main effect of type of account in RMANOVA of trials 5-10 
(P=.000). Cross-sectional ANOVA found this effect to be significant at trial 8 (P=.000), at 
which WM repeated the offense without explanation, as well as trials 5 (P=.000) and 10 
(P=.001), suggesting a strong carry-over effect of the account on trial 5. Where the effect was 
significant, justifications were consistently more acceptable than excuses. 
This result has some importance because the direction of the effect contradicts 
McLaughlin, Cody, and O'Hair's (1983) hypothesis that, because justifications threaten other's 
"face" more than excuses, they are less readily accepted. This hypothesis has been supported 
by several investigations (Hunter and McClelland, 1991; McClelland and Hunter, 1992; 
Riordan, Marlin, and Gidwani, 1988; Riordan, Marlin, and Kellog, 1983). But there is 
considerable other evidence that concrete circumstances of task, situation, and offense make 
a significant difference to the effectiveness of different kinds of accounts (Bell, Zahn, and 
Hopper, 1984; Blumstein, et al, 1974; Howard and Pike, 1986; Hunter, 1993; Much and 
Schweder, 1978; Tedeschi, et al, 1983). This suggests that it would be a mistake to generalize 
the effectiveness of justifications from the present experiment. At most, this finding tells us 
that it is equally a mistake to generalize from earlier investigations that excuses are always 
more readily accepted than justifications. 
B. The Interaction of Status and Type of Account. 
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The interaction of status with type of account in RMANOVA of trials 5-10 falls short 
of the 5% level of significance (P=.l). Nevertheless, the results are sufficiently consistent that, 
we believe it reasonable to conclude that status is an advantage when an offense is 
justified7 but a liability when it is excused. The behavior of high status WM's is consistently 
more acceptable than that of low status WM's when WM offers a justification of an offense, 
except for trial 7. (Trial 7, the WM's second repetition of expected behavior after the offense 
and account on trial 5, behaves differently from all other trials in block 2 not only in this but 
in three previous experiments in this setting. See Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch, 1997), 
Though the pattern is less consistent for excuses, the behavior of high status WM's is less 
acceptable than that of low status WM's when WM offers an excuse in five of the six trials in 
block 2. (There is no difference between the two on trial 6.) Averaging across trials 5, 6, 8, 9, 
and 10—omitting trial 7 because of our experience with it in earlier experiments—the behavior 
of high status WM's is 1.32 points more acceptable than that of low status WM's if WM offers 
a justification, while the behavior of high status WM's is .75 points less acceptable than that 
of low status WM's if WM offers an excuse. Though the significance levels are again soft, the 
status by account interaction is significant or almost significant on trials 5 (P=.08), 8 (P=.09), 
and 9 (.04). 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the relaxed significance level of the last analysis, we believe the data support 
the argument that status does not have the same effect on excuses that it has on justifications. 
The data confirm Scott & Lyman's (1968) hypothesis that status, because of its influence effect, 
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positively affects acceptance of justifications, but not their assumption that excuses behave like 
justifications. Instead, the present experiment supports the implication of attribution theory 
that, in excuse-making, status is a liability. Theories of accounts and attribution theory share 
the assumption that status creates expectancies: The higher the status the greater the expected 
ability and control over the situation. They differ over the consequences of such expectations 
for the credibility of excuses. What the present data support is the argument by attribution 
theory that such expectations are more likely to undermine the credibility of excuses by high 
than by low status offenders. 
We also found that, unlike much recent research on accounts, justifications were more 
readily accepted than excuses. But this is probably due to concrete details of offense and 
setting. All we can conclude from it is that it is a mistake to overgeneralize from previous 
findings that excuses are always more readily accepted than justifications. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. There is a great deal about attributions in an accounts context that will not be affected by 
status. For example, independent of status, unexpected, untoward acts are likely to give rise 
to attributions of stable, internal causes because they are non-common (Jones and Davis, 1965), 
non-consensual and non-normative (Kelley, 1967), and are likely to be hedonically relevant and 
personalized (Jones and McGillis, 1976). 
2. Weiner, et al's (1972) theory of achievement attribution, in which the inferred cause of high 
status success will be stable and internal, but the inferred cause of high status failure transient 
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and external, does not contradict this argument because unexpected, untoward acts are only 
"failures" after the fact, the definition of which is what is at issue in an account. 
3. This and the next section, including notes 4-6, are taken almost word for word from Massey, 
Freeman, and Zelditch, 1967. 
4. The setting introduces mixed motives, which are typically beyond the scope of theories of 
accounts, but the only relation we study in the present paper is between the subject and a 
(fictitious) water monitor whose only function is to replenish local water supplies and whose 
only motive is to maintain the common supply of water. 
5. A fixed order confounds within-subjects treatments with trial effects, but we did not 
randomize the trial at which offenses or accounts occurred because we do not study any 
within-subject effects in this experiment. 
6. Phase 2 found no gender differences in rating or reacting to accounts. We balanced gender 
as far as possible but disregard it in the present paper. We also pretested our status 
manipulation (see below) in phase 2. It had no effect on how subjects rated the acceptability 
of either excuses or justifications. 
7. Massey, Freeman, and Zelditch (1967) found that status was a liability if justifications were 
unambiguously unacceptable, hence the present finding is limited to justifications that are 
either unambiguously acceptable or else ambiguous. 
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Table 1: Mean Acceptability of the Water Monitor by Status and Type of Account by Trial 
Trial* 
Type of Status 2 3 4 Trials 5 6 7 8 9 10 Trials 
Account Condition n R NoR R 2 to 4 NoR,A R R NoR R NoR,A 5 to 10 
Justification High 22 16.05 10.59 14.00 13.55 14.18 15.32 15.00 11.50 15.27 13.05 14.05 
Justification Equal 20 16.60 8.00 13.80 12.80 13.10 14.95 15.25 9.30 12.70 12.65 12.99 
Excuse High 27 14.81 7.96 14.38 12.38 8.89 13.78 13.44 7.26 12.89 9.37 10.94 
Excuse Equal 23 16.65 7.22 13.43 12.43 10.91 13.78 14.04 7.35 13.74 10.17 11.67 
MeansbyTrial 92 15.96 8.41 13.93 12.76 11.58 14.40 14.36 8.74 13.63 11.16 12.31 
*R = Replenishment; NoR = No replenishment; NoR,A = No replenishment with an account 
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